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Abstract
This paper demonstrates how to analytically characterize the set of ra-
tional expectations equilibria in a simple stochastic New Keynesian model
with the zero lower bound. In this environment, purely forward-looking
(non-history-dependent) monetary policies are not generally consistent with
existence of rational expectations equilibria. In particular, equilibria exist
only when the volatility of the shocks is below some threshold level. This
non-existence result is a consequence of the fact that the expected aver-
age policy rate rises with the level of uncertainty in the presence of the zero
lower bound under forward-looking policies. History-dependent policies can
be designed to eliminate the tendency of the expected average policy rate
to rise with uncertainty, thereby potentially mitigating the non-existence
problems. The non-existence results are likely quite robust, as the only
structural feature of the economy upon which they depend is the Fisher
condition.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed substantial advances in the theory of monetary policy
in the presence of a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In deterministic
environments, the literature has developed some interesting analytical results.
However, in stochastic environments research has largely focused on numerical
analyses. In this paper, I provide theoretical results on the existence of rational
expectations equilibria in a standard stochastic New Keynesian model with the
zero lower bound (ZLB). In particular, I show that non-history-dependent pol-
icy rules are only consistent with existence of a stationary rational expectations
equilibrium when the volatility of the exogenous shocks is below some threshold
level. I provide an analytical characterization of this threshold, and I discuss its
implications for the feasibility of di¤erent targeted rates of ination. In addition,
I provide an example of how a history-dependent rule may be able to overcome
this non-existence problem.
The degree to which uncertainty about future shocks could a¤ect existence
of equilibria is quite varied in the ZLB literature. Some authors, such as Kato
and Nishiyama (2005), study e¤ectively backward-looking models in which the
volatility of shocks a¤ects optimal policy, but not the behaviour of private agents.
In this strand of the literature, forward-looking expectations do not play a role,
so existence of rational expectations equilibria is not an issue. Another approach
is to focus on deterministic forward-looking models (e.g., Jung, Teranishi and
Watanabe, 2005), or models in which there is an absorbing state (e.g., Eggertsson
and Woodford, 2003). Since these models are ultimately deterministic, uncer-
tainty does not a¤ect existence. More recently, advances in numerical methods
have permitted the quantitative study of ZLB models under standard conditions
of uncertainty and rational expectations (e.g., Adam and Billi, 2007). In these
models uncertainty can, in principle, a¤ect existence of rational expectations equi-
libria. However, the fact that they are solved numerically makes it di¢ cult, if
not impossible, to distinguish numerical problems from true non-existence.
Another branch of the literature studies the global properties of monetary pol-
icy rules in deterministic models with the ZLB. As Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2001) show, standard Taylor rules can lead to the existence of multiple
deterministic steady-states in the presence of the ZLB. This is a consequence of
the fact that both the Fisher condition and the Taylor rule must hold in equilib-
rium. In the presence of the ZLB, there are two pairs of steady-state interest
rates and ination that satisfy both equations simultaneously (Figure 1). One
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of the equilibria involves ination on target and a positive nominal interest rate.
The other involves deation and a zero nominal interest rate.1
In this paper, I discuss the set of rational expectations equilibria in a stochastic
New Keynesian model with the ZLB. I show that under non-history-dependent
rules, it is possible for there to exist zero, one or two equilibria. The possibility
of no equilibrium is a direct consequence of uncertainty about future shocks. The
intuition for non-existence is quite straightforward. An increase in the volatility
of the shocks causes an increase in the volatility of the central banks desired
nominal interest rate. But since the nominal rate is censored at zero, the mean of
the actual nominal rate increases when the volatility of the desired rate increases,
ceteris paribus (e.g., in Figure 2 the mean increases from L to H). All else equal,
an increase in the average nominal rate raises the average real interest rate, which
puts downward pressure on ination. If the Taylor principle is satised, then
the nominal rate falls more than one-for-one with ination, until the average real
rate has fallen to its natural level. The policy rule now associates a higher level
of the nominal interest rate with any given level of expected ination (Figure 3).
As volatility increases, the expected nominal interest rate continues to increase,
ceteris paribus. It is possible that the level of volatility can be high enough that
the expected nominal rate implied by the policy rule is always higher than the
expected nominal rate implied by the Fisher condition (Figure 4). This is the
case of non-existence.
Furthermore, I show that a corollary of the non-existence result is that there
exists a minimum feasible ination target. Attempting to target ination below
this minimum leads to non-existence. In particular, the Friedman rule ination
target is only feasible in deterministic economies. In stochastic economies, the
minimum feasible ination target is always greater than the negative of the real
interest rate.
Finally, I conjecture that an appropriately designed history-dependent policy
can eliminate the non-existence property. This conjecture is based on the propo-
sition that history-dependent policies can be designed to eliminate the tendency
of the expected policy rate to rise with the level of uncertainty. This suggests
that history-dependence not only leads to better outcomes, but it can also help
to guarantee existence of stationary rational expectations equilibria.
In Section 2, I review the canonical New Keynesian model that I employ in
the analysis. I present the main analytical results on existence in Section 3. In
1There are several ways of eliminating this "bad" equilibrium, including appropriately
history-dependent policy (see, e.g., Sugo and Ueda (2008)).
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Section 4, I discuss the potential benets of history-dependence. I conclude in
Section 5.
2. Model
I use a canonical New Keynesian model to conduct the analysis in the next sec-
tion. The microeconomic foundations of this model have been discussed at length
elsewhere, so I will not review them here.2 The structural equations of the model
are:
xt = Etxt+1   1

(it   Ett+1   rt) (1)
t = (1  )  + Ett+1 + xt (2)
where,
t  pt   pt 1 (3)
and pt is the log price level and rt is the exogenous natural real interest rate. I
assume that rt follows an exogenous stochastic process:
rt  N
 
r; 2r

(4)
I consider the case of persistent shocks in Appendix B (unnished), and I introduce
a shock to the Phillips curve in Appendix C (unnished).
I will analyze the implications of the zero lower bound when monetary policy
is conducted according to a simple rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993). The
rule species the central banks desired nominal interest rate, idt , as a function of
ination, t, and the output gap, xt (the output gap is dened as the log deviation
of output from its e¢ cient level). The monetary policy rule implements the
desired rate subject to the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound:
idt = r +  +  (t   ) + xxt (5)
it = max
 
0; idt

(6)
where r is the non-stochastic steady-state real interest rate,  is the central banks
ination target, and  > 0 and x > 0 are parameters. Note that (6) respects the
2See Woodford (2003) for the microfoundations of the this model.
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ZLB and will therefore lead to the existence of two non-stochastic steady-states
as described in the introduction. I assume that  and x satisfy:
 +

1  


x > 1 (7)
This condition ensures that the policy rule respects the Taylor principle that is,
the nominal interest rate responds more than one-for-one to expected ination in
periods in which the ZLB is not binding.
Although the results presented in the next section are based on (5)-(6), they
appear to apply much more generally to non-history-dependent rules. In particu-
lar, analogous results can be derived for rules with expectations of future variables
and for the optimal policy under discretion.
3. Analytical Results on Uncertainty and the ZLB
In order to obtain analytical results, I will rst characterize the distribution of the
nominal interest rate in the model described in the previous section. Most work
on the ZLB in stochastic forward-looking environments has resorted to numerical
methods because of the di¢ culty of analytically characterizing the equilibrium.
However, the absence of persistent state variables in the model of the previous
section facilitates the derivation of analytical results. In particular, the following
observation drastically simplies the problem.
Observation 1. The model (1)-(6) contains no lagged variables and rt is an
i.i.d. random variable. It follows that, in any stationary rational expectations
equilibrium (REE), the conditional expectations in this model are time-invariant
and equal to the respective unconditional expectations. That is, for any variable
y, we have:
Et [yt+j] = E [yt+j] 8j  1
Moreover, for the purposes of analyzing stationary REEs, the model (1)-(6) can
be written as:
idt = r +  +  (t   ) + xxt (8)
it = max
 
0; idt

(9)
xt = x
e   1

(it   e   rt) (10)
t = (1  )  + e + xt + bt (11)
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where the constants e and xe are dened as e  E [t+j] and xe  E [xt+j].3
This observation e¤ectively recasts the original system of expectational di¤er-
ence equations as a static system. Of course, this restatement of the problem
is only valid in a stochastic steady-state. However, this will su¢ ce for studying
the properties of stationary REEs.4 A necessary condition for the existence of
stationary REEs is that the unconditional expectations of endogenous variables
exist.
Condition 1. Existence of stationary rational expectations equilibria requires
that equations (9)-(11) hold in unconditional expectation. That is, the following
equations must hold:
ie = E [max (0; r +  +  (t   ) + xxt)] (12)
ie = e + r (13)
xe =

1  


(e   ) (14)
where ie  E [it].
Proof. See Appendix A.
This necessary condition states that there must exist values of ie, e and xe that
simultaneously solve (12)-(14). Equation (12) is the unconditional expectation of
the policy rule (6), equation (13) is the unconditional expectation of the IS curve
(1), and (14) is the unconditional expectation of the Phillips curve (2). Note
that the unconditional expectation of the IS curve yields the unconditional Fisher
relation.
In order to characterize the solution set of (12)-(14), I must rst evaluate
the expectation in (12). Examination of (12) reveals that the unconditional
expectation of the nominal interest rate must satisfy:
ie = Pr
 
idt < 0
  0 + 1  Pr  idt < 0E idt jidt  0
= Pr
 
idt  0

E

idt jidt  0

(15)
3Note that in making this observation, I am implicitly restricting attention to non-oscillatory
equilibria. This seems reasonable since any minimum state variable solution of this model (in
the sense of McCallum (1983)) will be non-oscillatory.
4I am using the terms "stochastic steady-state" and "stationary rational expectations equi-
librium" interchangeably.
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That is, the mean of it is simply a weighted average of zero and the mean of
idt conditional on i
d
t being at or above the lower bound. In order to character-
ize the probability and expectation in (15), note that the time-invariance of the
expectations substantially simplies the task of describing the behaviour of the
endogenous variables in a stochastic steady-state. The following lemma exploits
this fact.
Lemma 1. Given the time-invariance of expectations, the aggregate law of mo-
tion for zt = (it; xt; t)
0 is a piecewise linear function of the form:
zt =

cb + db (rt   r) 8rt < r
cnb + dnb (rt   r) 8rt  r
where cb, db, cnb and dnb are 3  1 vectors, and cb, cnb and r are functions of
e. Moreover, the two linear pieces of the aggregate law of motion are equal at
rt = r
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As shown in Appendix A, the piecewise linear law of motion for the nominal
interest rate is:
it =

0 8rt < r
r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1 (rt   r) 8rt  r (16)
where,
0  1 +

1


 + x

1  


  1

1 


 + + x

+
x


and,
r = r   1
1
[r +  + 0 (
e   )] (17)
The only unknown in the laws of motion is e (r is known up to a given e).
So, in order to characterize the set of steady-state equilibria, I must characterize
the set of solutions for e consistent with Condition 1. To this end, the next
proposition uses the results on the laws of motion to evaluate the expectation in
(12).
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Proposition 1. Let  () be the standard normal c.d.f. and let  () be the
standard normal p.d.f. Then, in any stationary rational expectations equilibrium
of the model (5)-(2), the expectation of the policy rule is given by:
ie = E [max (0; r +  +  (t   ) + xxt)]
= E [max (0; r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1 (rt   r))]
=

1  

r   r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1r

r   r
r

(18)
where,


r   r
r




r r
r

1  

r r
r

Proof. The rst equality is simply (12). The second equality follows from the
equilibrium law of motion for it, (16). To understand the third equality, recall
that equation (16) makes it a linear function of normal random variables when
rt  r, and implies a non-zero probability mass on it = 0 when rt < r. This is
the denition of a censored normal random variable. The expression for the mean
of it is simply the standard formula for the mean of a censored normal variable
(see, e.g., Greene, 2000).
Note that (15) and (18) have the same structure. In particular, the rst term
in square brackets in (18) is equal to Pr
 
idt  0

and the second term is equal to
E

idt jidt  0

. Using (18), I can evaluate the expectation in (12) and write the
the system (12)-(14) as:
ie =

1  

r   r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1r

r   r
r

 M (e;r) (19)
ie = e + r
 F (e) (20)
xe =

1  


(e   ) (21)
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where, for future notational convenience, I have dened M as the expected mon-
etary policy rule and F as the expected Fisher condition. The unconditional ex-
pectations (ie, e and xe) in any stationary REE are solutions to (19)-(21). The
number of solutions to this system is equal to the number of stationary REEs.
Since (17) makes r a function of e, this system is nonlinear in e. This makes
it impossible to solve the system analytically, but it is possible to characterize the
number of stationary REEs that exist and some of their properties. In order to
do this, note that xe only appears in (21). So, given e, this equation can be
used to residually determine xe. Thus, solutions for ie and e are characterized
by the system of two equations, (19) and (20).
Before turning to the formal results, consider the economic meaning of (19)
and (20). Recall that the IS curve, (1), is derived from a consumption Euler
equation. Taking the unconditional expectation of the IS curve yields the uncon-
ditional expectation of the Fisher condition, (20), just as one would expect from
an Euler equation. The Fisher condition species a linear relationship between
the expected nominal interest rate and any given level of expected ination. This
relationship is invariant to the shock variances, policy parameters and structural
parameters (with the exception of the discount factor which determines r).
Equation (19) species the expected nominal interest rate consistent with the
policy rule. Like the Fisher condition it provides a relationship between the ex-
pected nominal interest rate and any given level of expected ination. However,
it di¤ers from the Fisher condition in two important respects: (1) the implied
relationship between ie and e is nonlinear, and (2) the implied relationship is de-
pendent upon the policy parameters, structural parameters and variances. Since
(19) is the expected monetary policy rule, the reason for the dependence on the
policy parameters is obvious. Less obvious is that the relationship between ie and
e implied by (19) must depend on the structural parameters and variances. This
is a consequence of the fact that the policy rule depends on t and xt. So anything
that a¤ects the distributions of t and xt will necessarily a¤ect the expectation of
the policy rule implied interest rate.
With these results in hand, I can turn to the task of characterizing the condi-
tions for existence. In order to prove the results regarding existence, the following
lemmas will be used. The proofs for these lemmas are provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. M (e;r) is increasing and convex in e, 8r > 0.
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Lemma 3. The limits of the partial derivative of M with respect to e are:
lim
e ! 1
@M (e;r)
@e
= 0
lim
e !1
@M (e;r)
@e
= 0
Lemma 4. There exists a e that is dened such that:
@M (e;r)
@e

e=e
 @F (
e)
@e
= 1
and,
e    

r + 
0

 

1
0

r
 1

1  1
0

(22)
Lemma 5. For a given level of expected ination, e, the expected nominal in-
terest rate implied by the policy rule, M (e;r), is increasing in the level of
volatility, r:
@M (e;r)
@r
= 1

1  

r   r
r



r   r
r

> 0
Evaluating this derivative at e = e,
@M (e;r)
@r

e=e
= 1

 1

1  1
0

> 0
Lemmas 2 and 3 together state that the M is increasing and convex and that
the slope of M eventually exceeds the slope of F as e gets large (since 0 > 1).
This will be useful because it implies that if M lies below F for any e, then it
must cut F from below for some e. Lemma 4 states that M and F are parallel
at e = e, and Lemma 5 characterizes how the expected interest rate consistent
with M changes with the shock volatility, r. Lemma 5 is important because
the tendency of the M curve to shift up in (e, ie)-space is at the root of the
non-existence problem.
I can now state the main existence result.
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Proposition 2. There exists a r > 0 such that (i) M (
e;r) is tangent to
F (e) at e = e and the unique closed-form solution for r is:
r =

1  1
0

(r + )
1

 1

1  1
0
 (23)
(ii) for r = r there exists one stationary REE, (iii) for r < 

r there exist two
stationary REEs with e = eL < e and e = eH > e, and (iv) for r > r
there exist no stationary rational expectations equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, the existence of stationary REEs under a non-history-dependent policy
rule of the form (5)-(5) is sensitive to the degree of uncertainty in the economy,
as measured by the volatility of the exogenous shocks. Figure 3 shows M and F
for the case of r less than r, and Figure 4 shows M and F for the case of r
greater than r. Economically, in the case of r > 

r the expected real interest
rate consistent with the policy rule is too high (for all e) to bring desired saving
to zero as it must be in any equilibrium in this economy.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that the Friedman (1969) rule ination target
is infeasible in a stochastic economy with the ZLB and a non-history-dependent
policy rule of the form (5)-(6). The Friedman rule ination target,  =  r,
would cause r = 0 according to (23). Hence, under the assumed policy rule, the
Friedman rule ination target is infeasible for any positive shock variance. More
generally, as the following proposition states, (23) imposes a lower bound on the
ination target.
Proposition 3. There exists a Minimum Feasible Ination Target (MFIT), ,
such that there exist no stationary REEs if  < . The MFIT is given by:
 =  r + r
01

 1

1  1
0

(0   1) (24)
Proof. Replace r with an arbitrary r in (23). Denote the value of  that makes
(23) hold for arbitrary r by . This yields (24). The fact that @r=@ < 0
implies that r < r for any  < 
. This proves that no equilibria exist for
 < .
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Figure 5 graphically depicts the MFIT. The relationship between r and the
MFIT is clearly linear. Moreover, the gure makes clear the infeasibility of the
Friedman rule in stochastic economies.
It is also worth noting that the average natural rate of interest, r, is also an
important determinant of r in (23). Adam and Billi (2007) nd that under
discretionary policy, their algorithm fails to converge for low values of the steady-
state real interest rate. The role of r in (23) suggests that the problem Adam
and Billi encountered was not merely numerical. By reasoning analogous to that
in Proposition 3, there is a minimum level of the steady-state natural rate that is
consistent with equilibrium, holding all else equal. Thus, it is not surprising that
numerical techniques would fail to nd an equilibrium for su¢ ciently low values
of the r.
Proposition 4. When there are two distinct stationary REEs, average ination
will be increasing in r in the low-ination equilibrium and decreasing in r in
the high-ination equilibrium. That is:
@eL
@r

M(eL;r)=F (eL)
> 0
@eH
@r

M(eH ;r)=F (eH)
< 0
where eL < e and eH > e are the levels of expected ination in the low- and
high-ination equilibria, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4. A Conjecture Regarding the Benets of History Depen-
dence
The monetary policy rules considered in the preceding sections were all non-
history-dependent. That is, they specied the central banks actions as a function
of the current and expected future evolution of the economy. In contrast, in this
section I show that history-dependent policies can eliminate the non-existence
problem identied earlier.
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A history-dependent policy is a policy that makes the central banks current
actions dependent not only upon current and expected future variables, but also
upon past economic conditions. In economies with forward-looking agents, the
optimal monetary policy commitment will generally be history dependent. His-
tory dependence is optimal in such environments because it allows the central
bank to inuence private sector expectations in a stabilizing manner. In the
context of the zero lower bound, history dependence can be particularly bene-
cial. A commitment to reate after a ZLB episode can diminish both the length
and severity of such episodes. Such a policy is history-dependent because the
extent of the post-ZLB reation is dependent upon the cumulative disination
that occurred during the ZLB episode.
In the previous section, I showed that the interest rate implied by the non-
history-dependent policy rule is increasing in the degree of volatility, ceteris paribus.
This property of the non-history-dependent rule made it possible for the average
interest rate implied by the policy rule to be too high relative to the average nat-
ural rate of interest. This misalignment of the average actual and natural rates
of interest led to the non-existence result in Proposition 2. In contrast, appro-
priately designed history-dependent rules can eliminate the positive relationship
between the average interest rate implied by the policy rule and the level of volatil-
ity. To demonstrate this benet of history dependence, I employ as an example
a "catch-up" rule that adjusts the desired rate based on past ZLB episodes.
Under the catch-up rule, the desired rate evolves according to:
idt = rt +  +  (Ett+1   ) 
 
it 1   idt 1

(25)
This policy rule ratchets down the desired rate each time the lagged desired rate
is below the lagged actual rate (i.e., each time the zero bound is binding). In
this way, the rule can ensure that the policy rate is kept lower than it otherwise
would be after a ZLB episode.
As before, the ZLB implies that the actual policy rate is related to the desired
rate by:
it = max
 
0; idt

(26)
Dene a function cM that is the analog of M used in the previous section:
ie = E

max
 
0; idt
  cM (e;r)
For the non-history-dependent rule, Lemma 5 showed that @M=@r > 0. That
is, the M curve shifts up in (e, ie)-space as the volatility increases. The next
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proposition shows that this is not true for the history-dependent rules proposed
in this section.
Proposition 5. In any stationary REE, under a history-dependent policy rule of
the form (25) or (??), the expected policy rate,cM , is invariant to changes in r,
ceteris paribus. In particular,
@cM (e;r)
@r
= 0
Proof. Note that we can write (26) as:
it = max
 
0; idt

= idt + max
 
0; it   idt

(27)
Substituting (25) into (27) for the rst idt yields:
it = rt +  +  (Ett+1   ) 
 
it 1   idt 1

+ max
 
0; it   idt

(28)
Using the fact that
 
it 1   idt 1

= max
 
0; it 1   idt 1

:
it = rt +  +  (Ett+1   ) max
 
0; it 1   idt 1

+ max
 
0; it   idt

(29)
In any stationary REE, the unconditional expectation must exist:
ie = r +  +  (e   )  cM (e;r) (30)
Notice that the last two terms in (29) cancel in unconditional expectation. This
is important because it is precisely the expectations of max terms that would be
directly a¤ected by r. With the max terms gone, it is immediately apparent
from (30) that @cM=@r = 0 for a rule of the form (25).
Of course, this result does not guarantee existence of a stationary REE it
merely rules out the possibility that the cM curve shifts up in (e, ie)-space as the
volatility increases. However, given that the tendency of M to shift up was at
the root of the non-existence result in the previous section, I conjecture that a
broad class of history-dependent rules can indeed guarantee existence. I would
expect this class to include price-level targeting and the optimal policy under
commitment.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how to analytically characterize the equilibrium of the
canonical New Keynesian model with non-history-dependent policy and the ZLB.
The analytical results prove that non-history-dependent rules guarantee existence
of stationary REEs only for su¢ ciently low levels of uncertainty. Moreover, the
level of volatility places a lower bound on the level of ination that can be targeted
in a manner that is consistent with a stationary REE. I have also shown that there
is reason to expect history-dependent policies to be able to avoid the non-existence
problem.
The role of other policy levers at the ZLB remains to be explored. For
example, if government spending is used asymmetrically to o¤set the e¤ect of
shocks to the natural rate when the lower bound is binding, it could potentially
guarantee existence.
Finally, the results on non-existence are likely to be fairly robust (in the ab-
sence of other asymmetric policies). Non-existence arose solely from the interac-
tion of the expected Fisher condition and the expected policy rule. The Fisher
condition holds in almost all well-dened macroeconomic models. Thus, the spec-
ication of the policy rule is the key factor determining existence. This reinforces
the imperative to design policy rules that ensure existence of stationary REEs,
even in the presence of the ZLB.
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A. Proofs
Proof of Condition 1. Consider a general rational expectations system of the
form:
Et [f (zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t)] = 0 (31)
where zt is a vector of endogenous variables, "t is a vector of exogenous variables,
and f () is a vector-valued function. The model of Section 2 can be cast in this
form. Existence of stationary REEs requires that (31) holds in every state of
nature. Writing out the conditional expectations in (31) as integrals:Z
f (zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t) g (zt+1jst) dzt+1 = 0 (32)
where g is the density of zt+1 conditional on the state, st 
 
z0t 1; "
0
t
0
.
The unconditional expectation of (31) is:
E [f (Etzt+1; zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t)] =
Z Z
f (zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t) g (zt+1jst) dzt+1

h (st) dst
(33)
where h is the unconditional density of the state vector. Note that by (32) the
term in square brackets must be equal to zero in every state of nature, thus:
E [f (zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t)] = 0 (34)
This proves that for any rational expectations system of the form (31), existence
requires that the system hold in unconditional expectation.5
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that if the shocks are such that idt < 0, then the
endogenous variables will satisfy:
it = 0 (36)
xt = x
e +
1

(e + rt) (37)
t = (1  )  + e + xt (38)
5In the case in which the desired nominal interest rate depends on expected future variables,
it is straightforward to extend this result to a system of the form:
Et [f (Etzt+1; zt+1; zt; zt 1; "t)] = 0 (35)
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is and if the shocks are such that idt  0, the endogenous variables will satisfy:
it = r +  +  (t   ) + xxt (39)
xt = x
e   1

(it   e   rt) (40)
t = (1  )  + e + xt (41)
The solution for it in the case that idt < 0 is trivially it = 0. In the other case,
substituting (40) and (41) into (39) and using (14) yields:
it = r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1 (rt   r) (42)
where,
0  1 +

1


 + x

1  


  1

1 


 + + x

+
x


Let r be the value of rt such that it = 0:
r = r   1
1
[r +  + 0 (
e   )] (43)
Moreover, given the denition of r, it is clear that idt < 0 if and only if rt < r
,
and idt  0 if and only if rt  r. Thus, the equilibrium law of motion for it is:
it =

0 8rt < r
r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1 (rt   r) 8rt  r (44)
Solving (36)-(38) and (39)-(41), and using (14), gives the equilibrium laws of
motion for xt and t.
xt =
(  
1 


(e   ) + 1

(e + r) + 1

(rt   r) 8rt < rh 
1 

  1

(0   1)
i
(e   ) + 1

(1  1) (rt   r) 8rt  r (45)
t =
( 
1 + 


e + 

r + 

(rt   r) 8rt < r
e + 

(1  0) (e   ) +  (1  1) (rt   r) 8rt  r
(46)
So, the aggregate law of motion has the form stated in the lemma.
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Furthermore, evaluating (16) at rt = r makes both linear pieces equal to zero.
Similarly,evaluating (45) and (46) at rt = r makes both linear pieces equal at
xt = x
 and t = , where:
x 

1  


+
1


1  0
1

(e   ) + 1


1  1
1

(r + )
  e  



0
1

(e   ) +




(r + e) 



1
1

(r + )
This proves the equality of the two linear pieces of the aggregate law of motion at
rt = r
.
Proof of Lemma 2. The rst derivative is:
@M (e;r)
@e
=  0

r   r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1r

r   r
r

1
r

@r
@e
+

1  

r   r
r

0
+

1  

r   r
r

1r
0

r   r
r

1
r

@r
@e
or,
@M (e;r)
@e
= 

r   r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   )
1r
+ 

r   r
r

0
+

1  

r   r
r

0  

1  

r   r
r

0

r   r
r

0
where I have used the fact that (17) implies @r=@e =   (0=1) and the fact
that  () is the normal p.d.f. Using the denitions of  () and r, I can write:
@M (e;r)
@e
=

1  

r   r
r





r   r
r



r   r
r

  r
   r
r

0 + 0   0

r   r
r

0

Using the fact that the derivative of the standard normal p.d.f. is 0 (z) =  z (z),
it is straightforward to verify that 0 (z) =  (z) [ (z)  z]. Then,
@M (e;r)
@e
=

1  

r   r
r

0

r   r
r

0 + 0   0

r   r
r

0

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or,
@M (e;r)
@e
=

1  

r   r
r

0 (47)
Thus, the rst derivative is positive if, and only if, 0 is positive. It is easy to
verify that 0 > 1 as long as the Taylor principle, (7), is satised. This proves
that M (e;") is increasing in e.
The second derivative is:
@2M (e;r)
@ (e)2
= 

r   r
r

20
1r

> 0 (48)
This proves that M (e;r) is convex in e.
Proof of Lemma 3. The result follows immediately from (47) and the denition
of r.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since @M=@e is continuous, the existence of e follows
from the Lemma 3 and the Intermediate Value Theorem. To derive the expression
for e, set the derivative in (47) equal to unity and solve for e:
1  

 r +  + 0 (
e   )
1r

0  1
where I have used the denition of r. Solving for e gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 5. Using (19) to take the derivative ofM (e;r) with respect
to r:
@M (e;r)
@r
=  0

r   r
r

 r
   r
2r

r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1r

r   r
r

+

1  

r   r
r

1

r   r
r

+

1  

r   r
r

1r
0

r   r
r

 r
   r
2r

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Simplifying and using the denition of  ():
@M (e;r)
@r
= 

r   r
r

r   r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   )
r
+ 1

r   r
r

+

1  

r   r
r

1

r   r
r

 

1  

r   r
r

1
0

r   r
r

r   r
r

Using the denitions of  () and r, and rearranging:
@M (e;r)
@r
=

1  

r   r
r
8<: 1
h


r r
r

 

r r
r
i


r r
r

r r
r

+1

r r
r

  10

r r
r

r r
r
 9=;
Using 0 (z) = [ (z)  z] (z) gives the result:
@M (e;r)
@r
= 1

1  

r   r
r



r   r
r

To evaluate this derivative at e = e, use (17) to eliminate r and then use the
expression for e.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let g be the gap between the interest rate implied
by the Fisher condition and that implied by the monetary policy rule:
g (e;r) M (e;r)  F (e)
Then at e = e we have:
g (e (r) ;r)  M (e (r) ;r)  F (e (r))
= ie (r)  r   e (r)
where I have made explicit the dependence of ie and e on ". Given Lemmas
2 and 3, and the denitions of ie and e, I can prove (i) by proving that there
exists a r such that:
g (e (r) ;

r)  0
or,
r + e =

1  

r (e)  r
r

r +  + 0 (
e   ) + 1r

r (e)  r
r

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Substituting e (") from Lemma 4 and using the denition of r
:
r +   

r + 
0

 

1
0

r
 1

1  1
0

=  

1
0

r
 1

1  1
0

+

1
0

r

 1

1  1
0

Rearranging and using the denition of  ():
1  1
0

(r + ) = 1r

 1

1  1
0

Solving for ":
r =

1  1
0

(r + )
1

 1

1  1
0

Thus, as long as the Taylor principle (7) is respected6, there exists a unique r > 0
which makes M (e;r) tangent to F (
e) at e = e. This proves (i). The fact
that M and F are tangent at this point, implies that there is only one solution to
M (e;r) = F (
e). This proves (ii).
Note that the denitions of e and g (e;r) imply that e = arg min g (e;r).
As a consequence, g (e;r) > 0 implies thatM (e;r) > F (e) for all e. Also,
g (e;r) < 0 implies that M (e;r) < F (e). In this case, Lemmas 1 and 2
imply that M cuts F from above at some eL < e and M cuts F from below
at some eH > e, so there are two steady-state rational expectations equilibria.
Thus, to prove (iii) and (iv) it su¢ ces to prove that the following derivative is
positive:
@g (e;r)
@r

e=e
=
@M (e;r)
@r

e=e
  @F (
e)
@r
(49)
= 1

 1

1  1
0

> 0
The second line uses Lemma 5 and the fact that @F (e) =@r = 0. The derivative
in (49) is positive because 1 > 0 and 0 > 1 as long as (7) holds. This proves
(iii) and (iv).
6This is because 0 > 1 if and only if (7) holds.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let be 2 eL; eH	. In equilibrium,
M (be;r)  F (be)
Totally di¤erentiating this gives,
@M (be;r)
@be @be + @M (be;r)@r @r = @F (b
e)
@be @be
Using the denition of F ,
@M (be;r)
@be @be + @M (be;r)@r @r = @be
Thus,
@be
@r

M(be;r)=F (be) =

1  @M (be;r)
@be
 1
@M (be;r)
@r
(50)
Recall that from Lemmas 2 and 5 we know,
@M (e;r)
@e
=

1  

r   r
r

0 > 0
@M (e;r)
@r
= 1

1  

r   r
r



r   r
r

> 0
Since @M=@r is always positive, the sign of (50) depends on the sign of the term
in square brackets. Since M is convex and @M=@e = 1 when e = e, the sign
of the term in square brackets in (50) is,
sgn

1  @M
@e

=
8<:
 1 e > e
0 e = e
1 e < e
(51)
The result in the proposition follows from (50), (51) and the fact that eH > e
and eL < e.
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